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Abstract: Iris Murdoch both argues that perceptual experience itself can be 
evaluatively significant, and that the best way of making sense of this claim is 
to say that experience is shaped by the concepts that subjects possess and deploy 
as situated historical agents with a stance upon the world. This paper examines 
the implications of Murdoch’s distinctive conception of moral perception as a 
form of ‘vision’ revelatory of value for recent companions in guilt arguments 
for moral objectivism from thick evaluative concepts and speech act theory. I 
question the underlying motivation for holding that conventional norms that 
pertain to speech are themselves moral norms in developing a metaethical view 
of moral value (see Cuneo, 2014). Instead, I argue that there is an essentially 
relational dimension to realistic and continuous self-cultivation in concept 
application that is helpfully understood in terms of virtue. This, if I am right, 




As is well known, G.E. Moore held that the thin moral property of intrinsic goodness is 
neither reducible to, nor constituted by, natural properties, but that it supervenes or is 
determined by natural properties, and that we know which things are intrinsically good by 
means of intuition. To many philosophers, R.M. Hare and Bernard Williams included (who 
both hold that thin evaluative concepts such as good are not ‘world-guided’) this is too 
extravagant. Error-theorists such as John Mackie grant the objective purport of judgement 
involving moral concepts at the surface grammar of language but deny the objective world-
involvement of such judgements on the grounds that it is doubtful whether any 
scientifically respectable view of the world can allow properties other than natural ones. 
On this view, moral judgements are systematically false because the world simply cannot 
be the way the semantics of moral discourse would have us think. Other moral irrealist 
positions include emotivist and expressivist strategies of transforming the age-old 
philosophical project of accounting for the putative world-guidedness of moral thought 
into a research program of examining and re-evaluating the practical commitments and 
evaluative practices between speakers involved in moral discourse. On this view, moral 
judgements do not have as their function the cognitive function of representing the world 
(in which case the metaphysical sceptical concern about systematic “error” is also 




Hare sought to make progress with the familiar qualms about Moore’s non-naturalism 
about thin evaluative and deontic concepts such as good and right by drawing a distinction 
between descriptive and evaluative predicates such that the content of judgements 
involving thin moral terms is found, not in their extension (which is held to be empty), but 
in the functional role they play in expressing our belief about the desirability of doing 
certain actions and not others. Neo-Aristotelians such as Philippa Foot, by contrast, sought 
to make progress by reversing the order of explanation or analysis between general and 
specific value-terms.2 Foot argues that thin evaluative concepts should be understood in 
terms of substantive value-terms, the “thick” ones such as cruel and kind, where judgements 
involving the latter type of is seen as inherently evaluative that, if we want to say so, pick 
out “first-order” moral properties. 
While the general idea of being attuned to one’s environment thanks to the thick 
evaluative concepts used has been much discussed in the literature, in this paper I instead focus 
on Murdoch’s distinctive claim that one’s conceptions of these concepts decisively influence 
what we see.  My aim is to show that we owe many of the distinctive aspects of her narrative 
approach to the analytic origin of a descriptive rather than prescriptive methodology of 
ordinary language philosophy found in Iris Murdoch’s work, in a way that poses no threat 
to the idea of objectivity in ethics or the metaphysics of values. 
Contemporary use of the so-called companions in guilt strategy in metaethics 
typically proceeds by identifying a specific “innocent” target domain of philosophical 
inquiry as a dialectical companion that, if successful, could defuse the perceived threat 
posed by the moral irrealist. Prominent candidates in the literature include epistemology, 
mathematics, aesthetics, prudence. The use of companions in guilt arguments in 
metaethics has also seen a renewed interest in the normative dimension of speech and 
speaking and, indeed, the very concept of normativity itself. Thus, for example, while 
Terrence Cuneo (2007) is commonly cited as one of the first philosophers to develop the 
epistemic companions in guilt argument against the error theory, the target companion of 
Cuneo’s (2014) Speech and Morality is illocutionary speech acts associated with the linguistic 
philosophy of J.L Austin and Paul Grice.  
While I believe these authors are right to draw attention to the existence of 
assumptions and argument forms that are shared between different areas of inquiry at a 
highly general level, my aim in this essay is to show that the companions in guilt strategy 
for moral objectivism can only fully be appreciated in the context of broader metaphysical 




that there is an essentially relational dimension to realistic and continuous self-cultivation 
in concept application that is helpfully understood in terms of virtue. This, if I am right, 
brings into view a new perspective on the so-called companions in guilt strategy from 
speech acts in as much as the new argument calls into question what taking language 
seriously as an analytic tool in metaethics might in general be taken to be.  
 
2. Preliminaries and The Way Ahead 
In her remarkable 1956 symposium piece ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’ for the Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, Murdoch (1956) questions the very terms upon which the argument 
between Hare and Foot has been premised in a way that calls forth another category that 
is precluded by the traditional dichotomy between fact and value, between objective and 
subjective. With a focus on Hare, Murdoch aims to elucidate just why the disputants have 
gone wrong, which is so much more satisfying than the simple demonstration that they are 
wrong. Her central claim is that moral disagreement can stem from a difference in worldview, 
questioning the very conceptual foundations of a given moral outlook, a vision of the 
actual world that shapes precisely what one takes to be salient and not in moral 
disagreement. Crucially, worldviews are comprehensive outlooks on reality, an unruly mix of 
evaluative and non-evaluative claims in complex interaction as a whole.4 
Hare’s disagreement with Neo-Aristotelianism is complex but the feature that 
Murdoch singles out as the most fundamental is his position that a “conceptual apparatus” 
is something that one adopts, and that adopting such an apparatus is distinguishable in 
principle from adopting a moral view, thus construed as a system of moral principles. 
Hare’s (1965) view of morality involves a Kantian-like notion of universalisability applied 
to some prescriptive standard that we hold in a way that allows the speaker to choose her 
own standards, so long as we are prepared to hold it for everyone in principle. Such 
universalised standards serve as a basis for prescriptive statements of the form “x is good” 
(translated as “do or choose x”). Foot’s attack on Hare is that a judgement cannot be 
identified as a moral judgement simply on the basis of formal characteristics such as 
universalisability and prescriptivity. Instead, she holds goodness to be tied to human 
flourishing; what is common to moral evaluations is simply that all good things are ‘of the 
kind to perform their function well’; as she argues in Foot (1972), moral evaluations are 
“hypothetical” in the sense that they serve an end (human flourishing) and will not be 
considered as reason-giving by those who do not share this end). Using Murdoch’s 




as follows. Because fundamental moral disagreements may be more a matter of differences 
in structure of competing visions, one party cannot even see how the other ‘goes on’ to 
apply the term in question to new cases, or what might be the point of doing so. 
In what follows, I examine the implications of Murdoch’s position for two recent 
trends in meta-ethics. I start (Section 3) by reviewing the renewed interest in the non-
reductive cognitivist conception of thick evaluative concepts such as graceful or garish as 
non-evaluatively shapeless with respect to the lower-level properties that ground them. 
The second, which I return to in Section 5 below, is the preoccupation with arguments in 
the philosophy of language as applied to meta-ethics. These two trends are not 
unconnected. The revival of the non-reductive conception of the thick seems to have 
gained fuel from arguments in the philosophy of language, notably the rule-following 
argument and debates over semantic contextualism. (A similar trend is also visible in the 
contemporary discussions of the companions in guilt arguments in metaethics more 
generally.) As we shall see (Section 4), Murdoch’s account of morality effects an important 
critique of some of the historical precursors of recent companions in guilt arguments from 
thick evaluative concepts. More specifically, Cora Diamond (1988) notes that Murdoch’s 
views on concepts in moral perception ‘contain an important criticism of moral 
philosophers who think of themselves as attending to our moral language (Diamond: 1988: 
263).  
The upshot of this discussion (Section 4) raises the explanatory desiderata for 
Section 5: how to understand Murdoch’s difficult claim that agents with dissimilar 
worldviews “see different worlds”. In developing Murdoch’s distinctive attention to 
language in accounting for moral life, I argue that there is an essentially relational 
dimension to realistic and continuous self-cultivation concept application that is helpfully 
understood in terms of virtue. I also show that my notion of attunement in concept 
application is supported by Murdoch’s account of love in moral attention to the reality of 
the particular historical other (in a way that goes beyond the familiar Neo-Aristotelian 
framing of virtue in moral vision as correctly appraising what salient general concepts are 
operative in the situation at hand, according to which the virtuous person sees the 
circumstances differently to how a non-virtuous person would McDowell 1998; for 
internal Neo-Aristotelian criticisms of McDowell on this point, see Setiya 2013). 
I end (Section 6), with discussion of some meta-philosophical implications of the 






3. From Thick Evaluative Concepts to Murdoch’s Vision  
Murdoch argues that perceptual experience itself can be world-involving and evaluatively 
significant, and that the best way of making sense of this claim is to say that experience is 
shaped by the concepts that subjects possess and deploy as situated historical agents with a 
stance upon the world. Scepticism about world-involving views of value experience as a 
form of discernment is often motivated by worries that directly connect with the concerns 
with Moore’s position with which we started, most famously articulated in Mackie’s (1977) 
and Christine Korsgaard’s (1983) respective arguments to the effect that the only real moral 
realist there ever was in the history of philosophy is Plato. (Since Plato is allegedly the only 
metaethicist who has ever understood what moral realism would have to be like for it to 
discharge its explanatory obligations.) Platonist moral realism postulates a structure of the 
world that is non-perspectival and inherently evaluative: 
 
a) It is non-perspectival in that it is not particularly attuned to our human perspective 
and its peculiarities.  
 
b) It is inherently evaluative in that cognitive contact with that reality is inherently 
motivational for a fully rational agent. (Note that this also partly explains the 
ancient conception of virtue as knowledge.) 
 
While error theorists like Mackie are sometimes said to be nihilists, I will assume that it 
can be agreed on all hands that scepticism about absolute, non-perspectival, value 
representations need not imply a global form of  value scepticism: it can instead be relativized 
to some of  our inherited ideas, notably the kinds of  commitment that Platonism 
exemplifies. That leaves the door open for a positive account of  other values that do not 
depend, directly, on a Platonic form of  vindication. One popular such strategy in the history 
of  moral philosophy is Neo-Aristotelianism, notably John McDowell’s dispositional 
account of  value on a par with secondary qualities (McDowell, 1979; see also McDowell, 
1996, Other positive “subjective realist” accounts of  value worth mentioning at this 
juncture are Williams’ (1979) internal realism, which fuels much of  the recent turn to thick 
evaluative concepts in metatethics, and David Wiggin’s (1989) conceptual realism.  
Thick evaluative concepts thus occupy centre stage in metaethics due to what has 




guided’ turns on considerations about competence with thick concepts within a shared 
social practice. Many authors engaged in the contemporary debate about the thick have 
seized on this aspect of  Williams’ account and further hold the view that thick evaluative 
concepts are shapeless and exhaustive with respect to the non-evaluative features that ground 
them. On this view, sometimes referred to as non-reductive moral realism, for any thick 
evaluative concept, there need not be any corresponding non-evaluative categorization or 
kind that unifies all and only the things that fall under that concept from one case of  
application to the next. Rather, what unifies all and only the instances of  the concept (viz. 
kind), or what constitutes the real similarity shared by all its instances, is evaluative. This 
thesis is often supported by appeal to considerations about linguistic competence:  the 
nature of  the quality picked out by some thick evaluative concept is not determinable 
without using the concept in question; it is not independently discernible. What thus 
emerges is a conception of  thick concepts as playing a dual role in our thinking: Thick 
evaluative concepts trace out significant patterns in a nonetheless objective reality and at 
once guide action (broadly construed) in a way that is bound up with appropriately 
developed moral sensibilities. 
Now, one complication with such companions in guilt arguments for value 
objectivism is that their plausibility turns crucially on what is meant by raising the question 
in one’s understanding of  the very subject matter of  ‘morality’ and ‘moral philosophy’ and 
the relevant standard of  ‘objectivity’ (see Campbell, 2017). It seems plausible that there are 
conventional norms of  conversation, implicitly or explicitly recognised rights, 
responsibilities, and obligations associated with being a speaker-hearer within the very 
institution of  speech, norms to which the conversational partners can hold each other 
responsible. While some authors have argued that these conventional norms that pertain 
to speech are themselves moral norms in developing a metaethical view of  moral value as 
such (see Cuneo 2014), or that linguistic competence is itself  a moral competence (see 
Crary 2007), I will instead use Murdoch’s account of  self-cultivation in concept application 
to reappraise a relational concept of  attunement in the condition of  moral realism.  
According to Murdoch’s notion of  moral vision, when people disagree about 
moral questions, their disagreements do not partition cleanly into evaluative and non-
evaluative categories in the first place; it is rather that the disputants’ different worldviews 
generate conflicting narratives about the situation. Thus, while Hare and others present 
morality as primarily a matter of  choice, and treat moral disagreement as a matter of  difference 




focus from the concept of  ‘choice’ to the concept of  ‘vision’: a person’s conception of  
salient concepts may restrict, or enlarge (and may focus in one way or another) the range 
of  options that she is in a position to recognise as available for her to choose from.  Thus, 
Murdoch wants to deny that the person ‘chooses his reasons in terms of, and after 
surveying, the ordinary facts which lie open to everyone’ (Murdoch, IP in Existentialists and 
Mystics 1997: 327). So how does this relate to some of  the more recent precursors of  
companions in guilt arguments from moral language alluded to earlier?  
Let us take stock. Williams sought to make progress with Moore’s non-naturalism 
about thin concepts, such as that of intrinsic goodness (the extension of which Williams 
holds to be empty). Contrasting thin and thick evaluative concepts, Williams maintains that 
thick evaluative concepts are “world-guided”, in as much as the thoughts and judgements 
expressed by utterances involving terms such as ‘elegant, ‘garish’, ‘integrity’ are candidates 
for truth and falsity. At the same time thick evaluative concepts are also held to be “action-
guiding”, in the sense that, as Williams puts it, ‘they are characteristically related to reasons 
for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for 
action’. (1979: 140. Williams’ caveat about “typicality” thick evaluative concepts’ being 
ation-guiding is arguably due to his reasons internalism. On this reading, a given thick 
evaluative concept provides reasons only for those who endorse it (the value it may be 
used to ascribe) as part of one’s “insider” evaluative outlook and actual motivational set. 
To bring this point into sharper focus, I will, in what follows, concentrate on the 
‘anti-naturalistic’ attitude implicit in Mackie’s (1977: 67-77) discussion of  John Searle’s 
attempt at bridging the gap between facts and values. Searle argues for the reconciliation 
of  a special class of  evaluative and interest-involving facts, ‘institutional’ facts, as opposed 
to ‘brute’ facts. Searle’s distinction between institutional and brute facts is reminiscent of  
Williams’ attempt at reconciling facts and values by distinguishing two conceptions of  the 
concept of  “the world” in understanding thick evaluative concepts such as cruel and kind: 
the world as it is anyway (the world of  primary qualities, roughly) and the values-involving 
world as it is for us. As such, we may view it as a historical precursor to other well-known 
companions in guilt arguments for moral objectivism from response-dependent 
properties.  
The important point here is the implicit claim that judgements about moral salience 
in concept application are indeed a mystery, except from what one might call the moral 
point of view of those who are already embedded or initiated in the relevant moral practice. 




distinguishes describing the normative requirements of a given social or institutional practice 
from the “outside” by specifying what agents engaging in the institution are thereby 
committed to, and speaking from or “within” the social practice as a participant. Thus 
understood, moral requirements are akin to the rules of chess and other finite games; as 
he describes some such conceptual inferential rules, “‘You must not move that rook 
(because this would leave your king in check)’ or ‘Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars 
(because he promised to do so)’” (Mackie, 1977: 67).  
On contemporary non-reductive moral realist versions of this claim beyond 
Williams’ internal realism, the “new” non-naturalism, as it were, thick evaluative concepts 
are (non-Platonically) inherently evaluative. This view of thick concepts points to a vision of 
moral experience of the human world such that quite ordinary “facts” about everyday 
situations are laden with meaning or salience in moral thought and language. As McDowell 
once put it, ‘[w]e do not fully understand a virtuous person’s actions – we do not see the 
consistency in them – unless we [have] a grasp of his conception of how to live (McDowell, 
1979: 346, my emphasis). 
As noted by Cowie and Rowland in their Introduction of this volume, this 
development was prefigured by seminal work on the normativity of meaning implicit in 
McDowell’s remarks about “consistency” quoted above. Consider again Mackie’s response 
to Searle’s argument: 
 
…Searle’s main reply to his critics is a protest against the ‘anthropological attitude’, 
that is, against the use of the distinction on which I have relied between speaking 
outside and speaking within the institution. He argues that if we rely on such a 
distinction here, we must, for consistency, do so with regard to all parts of 
language, and this would undermine the validity of arguments on all topics, not 
just his. But this is not so. Words like ‘promise’ […], as used within their respective 
institutions, have a peculiar logical feature not shared by most parts of language. 
(Mackie, 1977: 71). 
 
Let us assume as uncontroversial the claim that promises entail moral obligations “within” 
the institution, such that promisors have a moral obligation to intend to do as they promise. 
The deeper issue is the related semantic claim that the entailment holds as a matter of  
metaphysical, normative or conceptual truth. Mackie’s response to Searle can be seen as 




costliness claim’ of  companions in guilt arguments. This the requirement that the 
argument in the moral domain over-generalises in ways so costly as to undermine its 
soundness. The problem for the companions in guilt argument from thick evaluative 
concepts is as follows. In general (and here I side with Pekka Väyrynen, 2014) either the 
relevant notion of  shapelessness about institutional concepts isn’t characteristic of  the 
evaluative in particular (maybe it holds for mental concepts and properties as well?), in 
which case it is not clear why the thesis should carry the sorts of  distinctive metaethical 
implications that get attributed to it. Or else the relevant notion of  shapelessness (proper) 
is supposed to be characteristic of  the evaluative in particular (contra Crary (2007), for 
instance), in which case it will be a problem for the inherent value thesis if  shapelessness 
can be explained on the basis of  more general factors about normative language. 
(Väyrynen, 2014; reference to Crary mine)  
 
4. Murdoch on G.E. Moore and ‘linguistic philosophy’ 
The upshot from the discussion thus far suggests that something stronger than conceptual 
competence is required for the identification of  moral distinctions as such. That also seems 
to the position of  Murdoch, who argues that we instead understand ordinary moral 
language relationally in terms of  loving attention. As Murdoch puts her point in a 
discussion of  moral attention in the work of  Simone Weil,  
 
We need more concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being; 
it is through an enriching and deepening of concepts that moral progress takes 
place […] We need a new vocabulary of attention. (Murdoch, 1997c [‘Against 
Dryness’]: 293) 
 
I will return to Mudoch’s implied relational concepts of  attunement and loving attention 
below (Section 5). As we shall see, the emphasis on the idea of  textured attention in 
understanding moral concepts presents a different starting point in understanding value 
experience compared to the familiar discussions of  the normativity of  meaning in the wake 
of  Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations in the subjective realist tradition (see 
McDowell, passim). First, however, we need to get clearer about Murdoch’s vision of  
language in relation to irrealist authors like Mackie and Hare. 
In a chapter entitled ‘Ethics and Metaphysics’ in her Existentialists and Mystics, 




she traces back to Moore’s linguistic approach to ethics. In separating the question of  what 
things are good from what the word ‘good’ means (a term Moore himself  held was 
indefinable), Murdoch argues that Moore paved the way for the modern philosophical 
tradition of  her times as one of  transforming the question of  goodness into a question of  
analysing the human activity of  valuing (or ‘commanding’). The modern philosopher, 
Murdoch laments in her essay ‘Metaphysics and Ethics’, ‘is no longer able to speak of  the 
Good as something real and transcendent, but to analyse the familiar human activity of  
endowing things with value’ (Murdoch, 1997: 60).  She writes: 
 
The simplest moral words (‘good’ and ‘right’) are selected for analysis, their 
meaning divided into a descriptive and an evaluative part, their descriptive part 
representing the factual criteria, the evaluative part representing a 
recommendation. And once the largely empirical disagreement about the 
application of principles and classifications of cases have been cleared up, ultimate 
differences will show up as differences of choice and recommendation in a 
common world of facts. What the modern moral philosopher has always done is 
what metaphysicians of the past have always done. He has produced a model. Only 
that it is not a model of any morality whatsoever. It is a model of its own morality. 
(Murdoch, 1997: 67). 
 
Murdoch was before her time in tracing what, in the debate over thick evaluative concepts 
in the 1980s and 90s became known as the ‘disentanglement manoeuvre’ (McDowell), to 
the linguistic philosophy of G.E. Moore. (For instance, it anticipates Elstein and Hurka’s 
(2009) point that while non-cognitivism about thick concepts requires a two-component 
factoring out approach to such concepts, it is also open to what they call ‘Moorean 
cognitivists’. Her objection to the linguistic approach in modern moral philosophy as “a 
model of its own morality” is two-fold. First, the empirical approach of the linguistic 
method obscures how real interpersonal moral discourse among people, thus understood 
as our ordinary ways with words from historically contingent and potentially conflicting 
life-worlds, gets a footing in the world. Second, Murdoch argues that the very definition 
of the topic of understanding what it is for judgements to deploy evaluative concepts as an 
“empirical” project in linguistic philosophy excludes from the start the possibility of such 




Murdoch identifies her contemporary Hare’s universal prescriptivism as a 
paradigmatic champion of the linguistic approach, and suggests that we distinguish three 
types of argument on which this view might be said to rest, 
 
…first, a general critical argument, to the effect that there are no metaphysical 
entities, second, a special critical argument to the effect that even if there were, we 
could not base an analysis on morality on them since it is impossible to argue from 
is to ought, from facts to value. Third, there are arguments, involving an appeal to 
our experience of morality, which support the various details of the analysis – the 
notion of guiding a choice, arguing referring to facts, judging a man by his conduct, 
and so on. (Murdoch, 1997: 63.) 
 
Murdoch identifies the first strand of the target view ‘anti-metaphysical’ and dubs the 
second argument surrounding facts and values ‘anti-naturalistic’ and ‘logical’ in character. 
The universal prescriptivist’s appeal to moral experience, in turn, is seen as ‘empirical’, 
‘behaviouristic’ and ‘non-conceptual’ (Murdoch, 1997: 63).  
It is worth pausing to reflect on what Murdoch should mean by ‘valuing’ here. On 
the face of it, there seems to be a conflation between value itself and the subjective 
conditions for valuation. As I have argued elsewhere, it is one thing to say that value-
sensitive creatures set themselves ends or purposes; it is quite another thing to say that 
how agents set values as their ends or goals in the course of deliberation about what to do 
determines what makes something a value. (Bergqvist 2018a) The conflation, as Korsgaard 
(1983) pointed out, is to run together two separate distinctions: value ‘for its own sake’ 
versus ‘instrumental’ value; and ‘intrinsic’ versus ‘extrinsic’ value. The intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction applies to values and what makes something a value; the latter applies to how 
agents set values as their ends or goals in the course of deliberation about what to do. This 
is open to complementing the account of value in ways compatible with Murdoch’s moral 
realism.  
Murdoch stays neutral on the further issue of what such a larger transcendent 
structure of reality might be (she mentions as options ‘a religious structure, or a social or 
historical one’ (Murdoch, 1997: 65). Her view on the concept of goodness is firmly realist 
in as much as the moral experience of goodness in historically situated moral agents is a 
matter of seeing things aright. As she puts it in her later essay ‘The Idea of Perfection’, 




discernment and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of 
opening one’s eyes but of a certain perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline’ (Murdoch, 
1997: 330). We have already the comparison with versions of subjective realism. In what 
follows I will focus on an alternative strategy based on the notion of situated representation 
(of a certain sort). 
Following Murdoch’s notion of moral experience being revelatory of value, we 
may understand objectivity in ethics as a matter of a judgement's revealing some aspect of 
the world to us, as opposed to some requirement of intersubjective convergence among 
ideal deliberators (recall Murdoch’s dismissive remarks about “empirical disagreement 
about the application of principles and classifications of cases” above). For the purposes 
of my argument here, I will understand Murdoch’s notion of a judgement's being world 
disclosing as neutral between those in the companions in guilt literature like Terrence 
Cuneo (2001) who take moral realism to require that moral properties be mind-
independent and those like McDowell (1985) for whom moral judgements can be objective 
even if moral properties are response-dependent (see Campbell 2017 for further discussion 
of such neutrality in companions in guilt arguments). 
What I want to stress now is just how much of Murdoch’s stance on moral 
experience as world-involving depends on the question of language. While Murdoch 
passionately dismisses the “linguistic method”, the distinctive character of her positive 
narrative approach to morality mirrors the analytic origin of a descriptive rather than 
prescriptive methodology of ordinary language philosophy found Hilary Putnam’s image 
of the “face” of meaning in what he calls our ‘natural cognitive relations with the world’ 
(Putnam, 1999: 69). In inviting us to reflect on the human world in the reductive empiricist 
manner that she identifies not only in specific positions (she discusses logical positivism, 
verificationism emotivism and prescriptivism at length) but as an impoverished 
predicament of us moderns in general, Murdoch wants to lay plain a certain form of 
conceptual loss that obscures the richly textured and subtly coloured character of language 
(Diamond, 1988: 262-263). 
Speaking in the first-person plural about the predicaments of us moderns as 
inheritors of an overly atomistic picture of moral agency, Murdoch laments a general ‘loss 
of concepts’ that such arguments leave behind.  She writes:  
 
What have we lost here? And what have we perhaps never had? We have suffered 




longer use a spread-out substantial picture of the manifold virtues of man and 
society. We no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which 
transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will surrounded by an easily 
comprehended empirical world. What we have never had, of course, is a 
satisfactory Liberal theory of personality, a theory of man as free and separate and 
related to a rich and complicated world from which, as a moral being, he has much 
to learn. We have bought the Liberal theory as it stands, because we have wished 
to encourage people to think for themselves as free, at the cost of surrendering the 
background. (Murdoch, 1997c [‘Against Dryness’]: 290) 
 
While Murdoch’s target is a certain type of philosophical blindness that she identifies in 
Hare’s position, she also seeks to make plain a general predicament that besets 
philosophers who fail to see her alternative vision of world-involving and others-implying 
concepts. She writes: 
 
These [empiricist] arguments only prove that we cannot picture morality as issuing 
from a philosophically established transcendent background, or from a factual 
background. But this is not yet to say that that the notion of belief in the 
transcendent can have no place in a philosophical account of morality.” (Murdoch, 
1997: 65). 
 
Such is the threat that Murdoch envisages in the reductive analytic project of separating 
the question of the meaning of ‘good’ from larger world-implying transcendent structures 
of moral speech and speakers: ‘you cannot attach morality to the substance of the world’ 
(p. 65).  As Niklas Forsberg (2018) puts it, ‘if, Murdoch contends, we imagine language as 
something that exists apart from, and can be understood fully without, values and 
evaluations, then we will misunderstand not only language, but also, and importantly, ethics 
and the human condition quite generally’ (Forsberg, 2018: 112). 
Let me turn now to other sources of difficulty in situating Murdoch’s position on 
language and thick concepts. One is the view of moral experience as detached and overly 
individualistic that Murdoch argues underlies the confusion in modern moral philosophy. 
She sees it as providing a distorted and superficial view of the moral self that leads to a 
separation between the style of argumentation and the significance of the historical moral 




Diamond (1988) puts it, ‘acceptance or rejection of such a philosophy of mind must 
profoundly affect the way in which one evaluates shifts in vocabulary and mode of 
thought.’ (Diamond 1988: 271). Murdoch writes: 
 
We are not isolated free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but “benighted 
creatures sunk in a reality whose nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly 
tempted to deform by fantasy. Our current picture of freedom encourages a 
dream-like facility; whereas what we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and 
complexity of moral life and the opacity of persons. We need more concepts in 
terms of which to picture the substance of our being; it is through an enriching 
and deepening of concepts that moral progress takes place. Simone Weil said that 
morality was a matter of attention, not of will. We need a new vocabulary of 
attention.’ (Murdoch, 1996c ‘Against Dryness’: 293).  
 
Murdoch argues for this conclusion at length by her well-known example of  a mother who 
comes to see her daughter-in-law in a new light as ‘refreshingly spontaneous’ (rather than 
juvenile and vulgar) through  an active and conscientious effort to attend to the girl and see 
her ‘as she really is’. What we have here is not just the reminder of  the importance of  
keeping one’s mind open so that one does not overlook some interesting alternative ways 
of  representing the circumstances. The claim is rather that you are morally required to 
adopt a critical stance because you could otherwise miss those morally salient aspects that 
could actually make a difference to the appropriateness of  one’s practical response.  
As I read her, it is because Murdoch understands art and morals as requiring 
undistorted vision and continuous critical attention to commonly articulated concepts and 
familiar problems that she links them with love. This, as we shall see, also serves as a 
corrective to an overly atomistic picture of  the moral situation of  the person and the moral 
activity of  thinking itself  that drives Murdoch’s interest in a different picture of  moral 
agency to that of  the ‘choice and argument’ (VCM: 81) model of  moral discourse, and the 
metaphor of  vision itself. 
 
 
5. From Companions in Concepts to Companions in Love 
A familiar story we are told about Murdoch’s account of moral attention is a criticism of 




well known, there is another dimension to her emphasis on the struggle to see that I find 
particularly helpful in understanding her moral realism. It is the reminder that unless one 
acknowledges, precisely, the social dimension of the ‘inner life’ in self-examination, there 
is also limited scope for perfection and self-transformation. Murdoch writes: 
The enemies of art and of morals, the enemies that is of love, are the same: social 
convention and neurosis. One may fail to see the individual ... because we are 
ourselves sunk in a social whole which we allow uncritically to determine our 
reactions, or because we see each other exclusively as so determined. Or we may 
fail to see the individual because we are completely enclosed in a fantasy world of 
our own into which we try to draw things from the outside, not grasping their 
reality and independence, making them into dream objects of our own. 
(SG: 216) 
Murdoch contrasts ‘fantasy’ with ethical imagination and argues that we are partially 
complicit in our own conceptions of  what the world is like. It is this predicament of  being 
partly hidden from ourselves in social convention that raises the issue of  responsibility in 
the struggle to see the world: what is needed is a certain critical orientation that goes with 
self-appraisal of  a kind that can be both realistic and continuous. As she puts it in her essay 
‘The Darkness of  Practical Reason’ in Existentialists and Mystics, we are partly obscured in 
vision ‘because the world we see already contains our values and we may not be aware of  
the slow delicate process of  imagination and will which have put those values there’ 
(Murdoch, 1997b: 200). In contrast to ‘fantasy’ (and ‘neurosis’), Murdoch speaks of  
imagination as the ‘effortful ability to see what lies before one more clearly, more justly, to 
consider new possibilities’ (MGM: 322, my emphasis). On this view, ‘Imagination is a kind 
of  freedom, a renewed ability to perceive and express the truth’ (E&M: 255). As Murdoch 
expresses it in her 1967 Leslie Stephen Lecture: 
 
The area of morals, and ergo of moral philosophy, can ... be seen ... as covering the 
whole of our mode of living and the quality of our relations with the world. (Murdoch, 1967 
SG: 97). 
 
While this aspect of  Murdoch’s position, that adequate moral ‘vision’ may itself  constitute 
a form of  moral knowledge, has been much discussed in the literature, I want to explore a 
different aspect of  the notion of  perception in the application of  concepts that is not 




attention is difficult because, and insofar as, we are partially complicit in our own conceptions 
of  what the world is like. 
What distinguishes Murdoch’s model of  moral agency from other influential Neo-
Aristotelian accounts of  moral vision framed as phronesis (see McDowell 1998) or rational 
norms (see Setiya 2013) is its emphasis on the theme of  love; as Murdoch puts it in her 
essay ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (later published in The Sovereignty of  Good), ‘we need a moral 
philosophy in which the concept of  love, so rarely mentioned now by philosophers, can 
once again be made central’ (SG: 45). Murdoch’s concern is this. Once we recognise the 
perspectival nature of  moral vision as always originating from within the socio-historical 
framework or vision of  individuals, we must also acknowledge that conceptions of  shared 
concepts in public language are themselves parochial. Thus, as Broackes (2012a) notes, 
‘our conception of  love—or of  courage or repentance (IP 29/322, 26/320)—will vary 
with age and experience; and our deepest and most revelatory experiences may, in a fairly 
ordinary sense, be remarkably private.’  (Broackes, 2012a: 13) Now, there are many sides to 
the notion of  ‘privacy’ in Murdoch’s work, but what matters here is the undeniable 
centrality of  outward-looking attention in Murdoch’s account of  self-cultivation and, in 
particular, its role for her discussion of  difficulty of  moral vision in relating to the reality 
of  others, and the metaphor of  ‘vision’ itself. A second noteworthy feature of  Murdoch’s 
account, which I hold is also present in the emphasis on our relationality in the quotation 
above, is the operation of  a multiplicity of  perspectives in creating opportunities for self-
cultivation. The explorative process of  rediscovery, which I have elsewhere argued 
(Bergqvist 2018b) is helpfully understood as moral self-development, crucially turns on 
adopting what Peter Goldie (2012) calls an outside ‘double-perspective’, an open-ended 
mirroring between the self  and others. As Ronald de Sousa puts it, in order to understand 
the reality of  other persons (and ourselves) ‘we need to empathise with the subject’s first-
person perspective, and we need to assess, from an outside point of  view, the 
appropriateness of  that that person’s judgement’—whilst yet bearing in mind that I might 
be mistaken or self-deceived at any of  these points in representing the relevant 
circumstances to myself. de Sousa 2016: 148). 
I have argued elsewhere (2018a; 2018b) that Murdoch’s elaboration of  the notion 
of  love in moral agency as a continuous ‘deepening’ is not restricted to the familiar Neo-
Aristotelian idea of  moral vision as a form of  rational awareness of  the shape and moral 
significance of  one’s situation (see McDowell 1998); Dancy 2004, Setiya 2013). Nor, I 




Velleman (1999) describes as a Kantian-like respectful recognition of  autonomy or rational 
agency of  others as such. Rather, Murdoch’s notion of  love requires moral attentiveness 
to the reality of  particular others, and the self, in an essentially relational way as historical 
persons. She writes:  
 
M’s activity is peculiarly her own. Its details are the details of this personality; and 
partly for this reason it may well be an activity which can only be performed 
privately. M could not do this thing in conversation with any other person. 
(IP: 22/317) 
What Murdoch seems to be saying here about the ‘difficulty’ of  understanding and self-
cultivation in moral vision is that, in order to understand whether M’s reappraisal of  D 
truly constitutes an appraisal of  D ‘for who she really is’ as opposed to projective distortion, 
for instance, we need to know more about M’s personality as a particular historical individual. 
This is a radical claim. As Hopwood puts it, ‘the question is not so much “is D really noisy 
or is she really gay?” but rather, “what does it mean for M specifically to call D noisy (or 
gay)?”’ (Hopwood, 2017: In Press).5 This, if  I am right, is yet another reminder that unless 
one acknowledges, precisely, the social dimension of  the ‘inner life’ in self-examination, 
what D means to M specifically as her daughter-in-law, there is only limited scope for 
perfection and self-cultivation in concept application. 
 Murdoch’s emphasis on relational moral personality and attunement in self-
development in her urge for “more concepts” paint a rich and textured picture of our 
different ways with words in ordinary moral life. My new argument here examines the 
wider implications of this emphasis on relational moral personality in creating 
opportunities for self-cultivation in concept application as a claim about the normative 
grounding of concepts. 
 I maintain that Murdoch’s rejection of an overly atomistic picture of the self in 
favour a relational model of moral vision and self-cultivation mirrors Murdoch’s wider 
position on language and, in particular, her emphasis on the role of the parochial in 
attending to differences in conceptions of shared concepts in public language; what the 
daughter-in-law D means to the mother M specifically as her daughter-in-law. Murdoch 
offers a comparison with art criticism to emphasise this point in a way that also speaks to 
the social dimension of the ‘privacy’ of the inner life as a condition for realistic and 





If a critic tells us that a picture has ‘functional colour’ or ‘significant form’ we 
need to know not only the picture but also something about his general theory in 
order to understand the remark. Similarly, if M says D is ‘common’, although the 
term does not belong to a technical vocabulary, this use of it can only be fully 
understood if we know not only D but [also] M. 
(IP: 32/325) 
So, what then, is it that a competent user of  concepts knows on this view? A common 
story that we find in Murdoch scholarship (e.g. Diamond 1982; Bergqvist 2018b) is that 
Murdoch’s call for “more concepts” in moral life emerges from a distinctively 
Wittgensteinian model of  practical rationality, a model of  attunement or sensitivity to the 
world grounded in what Stanley Cavell (1969: 52, 1979, passim) referred to as the ‘whirl of  
organism’ immanent in our experience as reasonable and mature moral agents who, as 
such, can be held accountable for what we say and what we do. On this view, the sources 
of  normativity come, not from independent rules of  application that are external to the 
relevant conceptual practice, but from other people. This presents us with a powerful 
alternative to the romanticised caricature of  moral agency that figures in Murdoch’s 
criticism of  the linguistic philosophy of  her times. To borrow a helpful image from Richard 
Moran, part of  the problem in creating opportunities for self-cultivation in concept 
application is that ‘the fate of  situatedness as such is not escapable’ (Moran 2012: 190). And 
yet, returning to the perceived difficulty of  loving attention, responsibility, we must at the 
same time recognise that individual thought and judgement is not thereby confined to 
commonly articulated concepts and familiar ideas in line with the default social 
conventions of  one’s moral situation. 
Given that Cavell’s work plays an important role in McDowell’s (1995, 1998) Neo-
Aristotelian framing of  virtuous moral agency as practical rationality in the application of  
and competence with general concepts, it is worth noting some finer nuances in Murdoch’s 
position on language. Each in their different way, Cavell and McDowell both stress the 
philosophical importance of  “the ordinary” in understanding the normativity of  meaning. 
The central claim is that the normative authority and philosophical authenticity of  the 
voice of  “our ordinary” experience and confidence with words in relating to the world and 
others is only audible from within everyday life. While I believe Murdoch would agree with 
the spirit of  such an account of  the normativity of  meaning, I also maintain that her 
distinctive emphasis on the operation of  a multiplicity of  perspectives in ordinary language 




simple: there is no single “voice” of  the ordinary lived experience (for further discussion of  
this issue in Cavell, see Overgaard 2010) Therefore, assuming that not every such “ordinary 
voice” (including one’s own) is reliable, if  we want a philosophical tool for capturing the 
significance of  ordinary experience in understanding morality (beyond its literary 
expression in art and fiction), what is needed is precisely a critical stance to the many 
background structures that subtly influence what we see in social conventions. 
If  my suggestion that Murdoch’s relational approach to morality would urge 
suspicion of  the notion of  “the ordinary” as what “we” believe and experience in life 
ordinary language philosophy is correct, this may also serve to partly explain Murdoch’s 
sweeping criticism of  ordinary language philosophy. As we have seen (Section 4), Murdoch 
distances herself  from what she calls “linguistic philosophy” and other writers in the so-
called ordinary language tradition in her writings due to her general suspicion of  the dry 
‘behaviourist’, ‘logical’ and ‘anti-naturalist’ empiricist tendencies of  the linguistic 
philosophy of  her times. Her central critique of  Hare can be seen as a general philosophical 
plea for “more concepts” against this background; it is one of  reminding readers of  the 
diversity and complexity of  “ordinary” lived experience in the many relationships that, for 
Murdoch, ground moral distinctions.  
In this regard, despite her many derogatory remarks about ‘linguistic philosophy’, 
Murdoch’s own use of  ordinary language and the richness of  moral experience as 
indispensable tools for moral philosophy in the elucidation of  moral vision as revelatory of  
value can be brought into sharper focus by comparison with Wittgenstein’s (1963) idea of  
a ‘perspicuous representation’ as being a key aspect of  the task of  philosophy as he sees 
it: offering a model of  comparison that ‘earmarks the form of  account we give, the way 
we look at things’ (PI §122) in order to achieve a ‘clear view’ of  that which is troubling us 
(PI §133). However this does not mean that there is some single philosophical method 
through which this is achieved. On the contrary, Wittgenstein presents the philosopher 
with an open-ended range of  conceptual tools and techniques that can be used in a variety 
of  different ways including (but not limited to): offering ‘objects of  comparison’ and 
presenting ‘alternative pictures’; pointing out particular ‘family resemblances’ and 
‘neglected aspects’ of  our language; grammatical analysis of  our use of  language in 
practice, and so on. The real task at hand is to discern which method available to one is 
the most pointful in each context of  critical appraisal for attaining clarity and reveal meaning 
– to which “whatever it takes” would be the only answer to give in the abstract. What 




of  the further proviso that the very concept of  some method being pointful (or not) will 
itself  depend on what conceptions of  shared concepts are operative between the speakers 
under consideration that implies their personality; what it would mean for M specifically to 
call D gay and lively in reappraising her moral personality in a loving way. What 
characterises such a stance? 
As I read her, there are two parts to the implicit corollary that there ‘is no outside’ 
in continuous self-cultivation in the application of  shared concepts. The first claim is an 
epistemic ‘no priority’ claim about knowledge in intersubjective relating, such that neither 
perspective of  the parties involved is prioritised over the other. The second claim is a claim 
about the meaning of  individual concepts as a function of  the wider interpersonal systems 
in which they operate (in ordinary language and beyond). Framed in this way, my concept 
of  attunement may also serve to elucidate an aspect of  Murdoch’s concern that ‘neurosis 
and social conversion’ (SG: 216) subtly structure our conceptions of  shared concepts. On 
the alternative view, the ability to communicate across differences in entrenched 
conceptual schemes that are inevitably operative in interpersonal encounters in an open-
ended way can perhaps be described as ‘ethical’ achievement because it serves as a crucial 
corrective of  being overly committed to “the voice” of  the prevailing norms and ways of  
seeing the world.  
Acknowledging qualities of  an historical individual as part of  the wider practical 
context of  a person’s life as the person they are, in turn, is an important aspect of  the first-
personal sense of  being understood—of  being visible and present to the other as me. 
Determining which of  the many perspectives that is operative in isolation from an 
individual’s wider systems of  meaning not only fails to acknowledge the reality of  another 
life-world, but in ignoring the shape of  individual worldviews, an important aspect of  the 
first-personal sense of  the object’s status of  being understood as a person may also be 
undermined. This, I maintain is also an important lesson to be drawn from Murdoch’s 
account of  the moral significance of  language as loving attunement. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Much contemporary work in metaethics makes heavy use of tools from philosophy of 
language and linguistics in understanding how our actual use of normative and evaluative 
terms work (see, e.g., Wedgewood (2001) conceptual role semantics for moral terms). 




metaphysical significance of this development; behind the concern that our actual 
normative and evaluative terms might systematically fail to ascribe corresponding 
normative and evaluative properties is the age-old challenge of how (moral) thought gets 
a footing in the world. More precisely, the threat is that our actual moral language does 
not reliably and systematically track corresponding moral properties. Indeed, Ralph 
Wedgewood (2001) holds that we ‘should reject the very idea of moral properties’ if what 
he terms ‘the semantics of moral terms’ is shown to come down in favour of emotivism 
(2001: 3). Assuming, with the error theorist, that the surface grammar of actual moral 
language is precisely not non-cognitive in character, in making this assertion Wedgewood 
describes how some possible moral vocabulary works. This is not an uncommon view. 
Indeed, as Matti Eklund (2017) notes, when Moore discussed the unanalyzability of ‘good’, 
he too talked about how some possible moral discourse could work. (Eklund, 2017: 197) 
Murdoch, in contrast, anchors the moral concepts firmly in the texture of interpersonal 
relationships between historically situated moral agents.  
The central difference between Murdoch’s position on language and the linguistic 
accounts of normative language it is situated against is precisely this: even if these other 
accounts do describe alternative possible languages, Murdoch holds that the existence of 
such possible languages does not as such pose a threat to the normative authority and 
philosophical authenticity of the voice of the multifaced “voice” of experience in ordinary 
moral life. On this view, what Eklund classes as ‘the question which language we ought to 
use’ (Eklund 2018: 197) does not arise. Or, better, to the extent that the question of “which 
language” to use does arise, this will be due to first-order moral and political reasons about 
what concepts in public moral discourse are appropriate and not appropriate, claims about 
wider systems of meaning adduced between the speakers as historically situated moral 
agents within; it will not be due to philosophical considerations about what an adequate 
theory of actual normative language in philosophy of language amounts to.  
But what is the analogue conception of value that this new way of seeing the matter 
of meaning brings with it? On my account, the property of being attuned to a human 
perspective has to do with the nature of value rather than the nature of evaluative thought 
or experience. It is worth pausing to note the difference between this reading of Murdoch’s 
claim that worldviews can reveal value and an alternative epistemic construal whereby the 
perspectivalness of value thesis is defined as a feature of Murdochian moral vision. If the 
central notion of perspective were understood as epistemic in this way, the resulting 




Platonism would just be defined in incompatible ways.)7 By contrast, my impression is that 
some value is non-perspectival just in case it does not depend on human perspectives and 
worldviews for its existence. To illustrate, if value were non-perspectival, then vision of 
value would be analogous to vision of objects such as, say, pine trees (e.g., a Scots pine). 
Pine trees don’t depend on human perspectives or worldviews for their existence, although 
our human sensibilities are capable of perceiving them.  
So far, I have sought to show that we can make sense of Murdoch’s claim that 
worldviews can reveal value without committing ourselves either to Platonism or 
anthropocentrism. The suggestion was that moral vision puts pressure on us to have a 
conception of value according to which what is valuable is not valuable from the point of view 
of the universe but valuable for us. Although moral vision on its own is largely neutral to the 
question of the nature of value, my position is that Murdoch’s notion of the concept 
ultimately fits best with a conception of value that is in some sense perspectival rather than 
Platonic. This raises a number of meta-philosophical questions concerning the relation 
between moral vision and the notion of non-perspectival value with which we started.  
If the notion of non-perspectival value is better understood in metaphysical terms, 
does it not follow that the concept of perspectival value is value that does metaphysically 
depend on human perspectives and worldviews for its existence? No. We can talk of 
perspectival value in different ways. It might mean that value is fixed by our actual 
perspectives and worldviews, whatever those happen to be. This would lead to a highly 
subjectivist picture. But there is space for an alternative view. The alternative says that 
value would not exist but for creatures with perspectives and worldviews, but actual 
perspectives and worldviews can be mistaken. Such perspectival value is for us, and we can 
be better or worse at detecting it in realistic and continuous self-cultivation in concept 
application as a relational and historically situated endeavour.  
This, I conclude, is the main lesson we may draw from Iris Murdoch’s account of 
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1 This paper is due to appear in Christopher Cowie and Richard Rowland (eds.), 
Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics, presently under contract with Routledge. 
2 It does not matter for the purposes of introduction what is the precise relationship 
between predicates and concepts: I will use ‘term’ to stay neutral on this metaphysical issue 
for the moment. 
3 My own work on moral perception, for instance, implicitly assumes Putnam’s (2002) 
insight that such openness can improve understanding of the target concept (evaluative 
perception) in light of our understanding of arguments from other specific “sub-fields” of 
philosophy – such as discussions of ‘high-level content’ and ‘theory-ladenness of 
experience’ in philosophy of perception and epistemology (see Bergqvist 2018a). 
Elsewhere I have developed specific new arguments for ‘particularism’ in aesthetics by 




                                                                                                                             
analogy with specific arguments surrounding ‘holism about reasons’ in the domain of 
ethics (Bergqvist, 2010) 
4 Murdoch’s book Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals will henceforth be abbreviated ‘MGM’. 
‘IP’ stands for the essay ‘The Idea of Perception’. ‘OGG’ stands for the essay ‘On “God” 
and “Good”’. ‘SGC’ stands for the essay ’The Sovereignty of Good over other Concepts’ 
(‘SGC’) For the three essays (IP, OGG, SGC) that make up the collection The Sovereignty of 
Good, page references are given both to 1970 Penguin volume with the same name, 
abbreviated ‘SG’, and, where possible, to the reprints in the 1997 volume Existentialists 
and Mystics, abbreviated ‘E&M’. ‘SBR’ refers to the 1959 essay ‘The Sublime and the 
Beautiful Revisited’, which is also reprinted in the 1997 E&M volume; ‘VCM’ refers to 
her 1956 ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’. 
5 Hopwood (2017) frames the problem of classifying particulars under universal concepts 
as one of finding the right ‘description’ but the implicit notion of thick description is not 
really explained; rather the central topic of the sections in Murdoch that interests us both 
appears to be the need for imagination and constant critical self-appraisal in relating to 
the world and others in a personal way. 
6 In a discussion of perfectionism, Cavell 1991 distances his preferred ‘Emersonian 
perfectionism’ from what he understands Murdoch’s moral perfectionism to be. I 
maintain Cavell misunderstands Murdoch’s position because he overlooks the centrality 
theme of love and relationality but I cannot defend that claim here.  
7 I thank Michael Milona for this observation. 
8 This paper is dedicated to the bright, loving memory of Rosalyne Ewart. 
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